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Is Ml Ruined?-Part II
The recent removal ofinterest rate ceilings
on checkable deposits raises important
questions about the Federal Reserve's
method ofconducting monetary policy.
This deposit-rate deregulation was accom-
plished in December 1982 and January
1983 when Federal regulators authorized
banks and thrift institutions to issue Money
Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs), which
can be held by businesses, households and
other depositors, and Super-NOW accounts,
which businesses are not permitted to hold.
Both types of accounts are free ofinterest
rate ceilings and offer checking privileges.
Super-NOWshaveunlimitedcheckingpriv-
ileges and are therefore counted in the
monetary aggregate called M 1. Historically
this aggregate has been the principle money
stock measure used bythe Fed as aguidefor
monetary policy. It attempts to measure
funds readily available to the public for
spending. MMDAs are excluded from M1
because they offer only limited withdrawal
-six non-personal transfers per month,
three of which may be checks. MMDAs are
included in a broader aggregate called M2.
The previous Letterdescribed some poten-
tial problemscaused bydeposit-ratederegu-
lation for the usefulness ofM1 as a guide for
monetary policy. It addressed the issues of
whether M 1 will continue to be a leading
indicatorofeconomic activity, and whether
serious monetary control problems wiII de-
velop. It showed that there is a good chance
that these problems will not be serious. •
In this Letter, we address another potential
problem. Some observers fear thatby raising
yields on checkable deposits, deregulation
could attract a substantial volume ofhouse-
holds' savings (Le., non-transactions) bal-
ances into M 1 and thereby change its unique
transactions character and reduce its rei ia-
bility for policy. The discussion below
argues that any change in Ml's character
depends on how attractively depository
institutions price Super-NOWs versus
MMDAs. The available evidence is not
conclusive, but suggests an optimistic con-
clusion: M 1 is likelyto retain itstransactions
character and continue to be the most reli-
able policy guide available to the Fed.
Potential problem
Since the mid-1970s, the Fed has an-
nounced annual target ranges for several
monetary aggregates even though ithas
focused its attention mostoften on M1. This
choice ofM 1-targeting is based on the rela-
tively close link between the quantityof
money the public chooses tohold in its port-
foliooffinancial assets and GNP, prices and
interest rates. This link, established through
what economists call the public's demand
for money, allows the Fed to forecast the
effects of its policies on the economy, and
thus makes M1 a potentially useful inter-
mediate target for monetary policy.
Deposit-ratederegulationcould cause prob-
lems for M 1-targeting because higher yields
on M1 may induce the public to use it as a
savings vehicleto asignificantdegree. Ifthis
should happen, it would alter Ml's unique
transactions characterand itsdirectconnec-
tion to income and prices. This does not
mean that M 1 will cease to function as the
medium ofexchange. It means instead that
the publicmaycommingle in M 1the funds it
holds for making transactions with funds it
holds for investment purposes. This has not
occurred to a significant degree in the past
because ofinterest rate ceilings on M 1assets.
Most non-transactions funds were invested
in financial assets that paid much higher
rates ofreturn than those in M 1. But with M 1
paying market returns, investors might find
itadvantageous to move some investment
funds into IItransaction" accounts.
Ifthis were to occur, M1 would become a
closer substitute for non-checkablefinancial
assets in the past. The public's demand toIF~cdl~ifi1i\ll TI«(~~~ if\1J1~
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hold M1might become more highlyrespon-
sive to changes in the "normal" spreads
between M1's own rate of return and rates
paid on a wide range offinancial instru-
ments not included in M 1, The demand for
M 1mightbecome more sensitive tochanges
in yields on long-term bonds and common
stocks, And shifts in investors' preferences
for various maturities and liquidity charac-
teristics also would have larger effects on
Ml demand, as would changes in precau-
tionary motives over the business cycle,
In general, since Ml would become more
like the various financial assets held for
investment purposes, changes inMl could
be dominated at varioustimes byshifts in the
composition ofthe public's portfolio, and
only incidentally by changes in income
and prices,
An empirical issue
Theextenttowhich savings and transactions
balances are mixed together in M1 depends
critically on the spread between yields on
M 1versus other liquid assets, In otherwords
this is an empirical issue depending on
yields banks pay on Super-NOWs (transac-
tions accounts included in M1) versus those
on MMDAs (primarily savings-type deposit
not in M1), To the extentthatSuper-NOWs
are priced attractively compared to MMDAs,
M 1 will be contaminated as a measure of
transactions balances, The opposite pricing
strategy would tend to preserve its transac-
tions character.
There are two reasons that yields on Super-
NOWs can be expectedto be lowerthan
those on MMDAs and other liquid assets,
First, the Fed requires that depository institu-
tions (excluding very small ones) hold 12
percent offunds obtained through Super-
NOWs in the form of non-interest earning
reserves, while MMDAs have a reserve re-
quirementofthree percent ifthey are non-
personal accounts, (Personal MMDAs have
no reserve requirements,) Thus, institutions
will pay lower yields on Super-NOWs to
compensate for the loss in earnings on the
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reserves that must be held against them,
Second, depository institutions may choose
to charge for some ofthe expenses they
incur in servicing high-turnover Super-
NOWs by reducing their yields below those
on MMDAs, The evidence thus far confirms
these expectations, As ofthe end ofFebru-
ary, yields on MMDAs averaged about 8'14
percent at commercial banks while Super-
NOWs averaged about 714 p~rcent.
Corporate deposits
Although it is relatively certain that Super-
NOWs will continue to yield lowerreturns
than non-transactions liquid assets it is still
too early to ascertain whether this spread
wiII be largeenough toseparatetransactions
from savings balances for households, How-
ever, the behavior ofcorporate transactions
balances in the 1970s suggests that such a
separation is possible,
At least since the mid-1970s, large corpora-
tions have earned implicit rates of return on
their non-interest-bearing checking account
balances, Implicit returns are paid through
an arrangement whereby the checking
account balances that corporations wish to
hold are counted as payment for cash
management and credit services provided
bythebank to the corporate customer. Thus,
each dollar held in the checking account is
multiplied bythe implicitrate ofreturn to be
paid on the account, and the result ofthis
calculation is counted as payment for ser-
vices, Services not paid for bythese deposits
can be paid forthrough explicit fees, In this
way, the legal prohibition on thepaymentof
interest on corporate checking account bal-
ances is effectively circumvented,
These arrangements mean that the behavior
ofbanks and their large corporate customers
since the mid-1970s provides insight into
the world underderegulated yields on trans-
action deposits, Interviews with corporate
.treasurers and bankers suggest that (implicit)
returns on checking account balances gen-
erally have been set at some open market
rate (for example, the three-month Treasurybill rate) minus the cost to the bank ofre-
serve requirements, and have usually been
adjusted according to market rates on a
monthlyor quarterly basis. These corpora-
tions, then, appear to have earned roughly
the competitive rate ofreturn on demand
deposit balances that they would have
earned under deregulated deposit rates.
The evidence suggests that these competi-
tive yield spreads between deposits and
liquid assets were large enough to induce
most ofthe corporations to minimize their
checking account balances for a given
volume oftransactions. Liquid funds in
excess ofthis transactions demand are put
into higher yielding savings-type instru-
ments. in this way, the transactions and
investment funds are effectively separated.
Whetherthis evidence may be applied to
households is the crucial question. Such a
competitive yield spread almost certainly
will be sufficient to separate the funds ofthe
more financially sophisticated households.
However, it may be argued that some house-
holds will notfind it beneficial to engage
in the "high-powered" cash management
activities that corporations, with their pro-
fessional staffs and largebalances, find prof-
itable. Ifthis is the case, then a yield spread
such as the one faced by corporations may
not induce households to separate their
transactions and savings balances. Instead,
households may reduce the time and costof
managing their money by "lumping" their
transactions and savings balances together
in a Super-NOW.
However, it is also possible that with Super-
NOWs and MMDAs in the same depository
institutions, these institutions will offer cash
managementservices to householdsat fairly
low cost. The MMDA, with its six non-
personal transfers permonth, would seem to
be an efficient cash managementdevice.
Savings balances could be kept inthe
MMDAand transferred to the Super-NOWs
as they are needed for transactions pur-
poses. Thus, financially less sophisticated
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households maybeabletorely ontheexper-
tise oftheir depository institutions to help
them keep their asset and transactions
demands separate.
Optimism
There appears to be room for optimism that
deposit-rate deregulation wi.1I notcontami-
nate the transactions character ofM 1.
However, itis notpossibletodrawfirm cOn-
clusions until we see howthe public re-
sponds to the availabilityofSuper-NOWs
and MMDAs. The most favorable set of
developments for M 1targeting would be for
MMDAsto be significantly more popular
than Super-NOWs. This would tend to be
indicated if large quantitiesofsavings bal-
ances were to flow into MMDAs (which are
notin M 1), ratherthan Super-NOWs(which
are in M 1). indeed, the evidence thus far
confirms this scenario. MMDAs have been
extremely popular, having grown to about
$300 billion by mid-March 1983. Super-
NOWs, on the other hand, rose to only
about $25 billion by the same date.
Further supporting evidence comes from
this Bank's money market model, which
predicts M 1 on the basis ofmarket interest
rates, income, prices and changes in bank
loans. These underlyingfactors predicted an
annual M 1 growth rate of 13 percent in
January and February 1983 based on histor-
ical patterns, without taking account of
recent deregulation. Ifthere were large
inflowsofsavings-type funds intothe Super-
NOWs, M 1 could be expected to grow
much faster than the model's predictions.
In fact, M 1 grewat a 16-percentrate in
January-February 1983, only 3 percentage
points faster than the growth explained by
factors other than deregulation. Thus, the
evidence to date provides no basis for the
conclusion thatM 1has yet been significant-
ly contaminated with savings-type funds. If
the public's initial reaction to Super-NOWs
and MMDAscontinues, M1 is likelyto retain
its transactions character, and its usefulness
for monetary policy.
John P. JuddSSV1::l .lSl:lI:l
llOlSU14SPM.4Pln • UO§;;.UO • epeAaN • 04ePI










~\\Jl@\\lliJ ~JJ ~dI@<\lJ \\j];J)JJ~@\E;@cqI











loans (gross; adjusted) and investments" 163,788 - 225 5,504 3.5
loans(gross, adjusted) - total# 142,708 220 5,764 4.2
Commercial and industrial 45,509 460 3,452 8.2
Real estate 57,245 - 114 379 0.7
Loans to individuals 23,417 11 191 0.8
Securities loans 2,588 - 313 513 24.7
U.S. Treasury securities" 8,074 45 1,843 29.6
Othersecurities" 13,005 - 491 - 2,103 - 13.9
Demand deposits - total# 40,831 1,411 1,841 4.7
Demand deposits - adjusted 27,560 - 612 354 1.3
Savings deposits - total 65,002 376 34,252 111.4
Time deposits -total# 68,490 - 937 - 23,200 - 25.3
Individuals, part & corp. 60,750 - 748 - 21,433 - 26.1
(large negotiable CD'sl 21,720 - 706 - 13,143 - 37.7
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+1/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings
















'" Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments may be addressed to theeditor(Gregory Tong) or to theauthor.... Free
copiesof this and other Federal Reserve publications'can beobtained by callingor writing the
Public InformationSection, Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,San
Francisco94120. Phone(415) 974~2246.